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Abstract This paper is a critical review of Mitchell Green’s Self-Expression. The
principal focus is on Green’s contention that all expression is at route, a form of
signalling by an agent or by some mechanism of the organism which has been
evolutionary selected for signalling. Starting from the idea that in some but not all
expression an agent seeks to express his or her self, I question the centrality of
communication to the idea of expression.
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1. In Self-Expression Mitchell Green offers us an elegant, economical, and powerful
theory of expression which reaches from a grimace or curled lip, through verbal
behavior, to Mahler’s Ninth and the Angel of the North. A seemingly diverse group
of psychological phenomena and behaviors are brought under the discipline of a
common purpose. From the revelation of affect in behavior and play, engaging in
linguistic communication, letting others know how you really feel, to using artistic
artifacts for the expression of emotion or mood, all of these are to be explained as
examples of expression. Green sees expression as at root a mode of communication:
one shows one’s psychological state through either making it perceptible; showing
that one is in that state; or showing how it feels. What unites all of this is the
following thought: an agent engages in expression where she signals her subjective
point of view.
In Green’s picture of speaker-meaning we can both show things as well as show
that something is the case. This contrasts with the narrower focus on speaker-
meaning found in the Gricean project which overemphasizes showing that,
something closely associated with linguistic communication and the use of signs
mediated through convention. According to Green, through utilizing biologically
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endowed mechanisms we can show others some of our psychological states; indeed
they can literally become objects of sight. This too, for him, belongs within the
domain of speaker-meaning. And when we express ourselves in this way, he
suggests, we can press a demand on others to empathize with us in order that they
come to our aid or at least better understand us. In turn the possibility of making a
psychological state manifest through expression leads to an account of how we are to
understand the ways in which the arts can be expressive: music or a picture may
show us a particular feeling or a way of regarding the world. What initially appears
to be a tangle of overlapping phenomena, are revealed as belonging to a central
psychological kind.
For Green, expression is often about making a connection between our
psychological states and other people; allowing these people to come to be acquainted
with our feelings. The inputs to expression are psychological states which are
introspectible, and its outcomes (when an audience takes up the expression) are either
the showing of something, or the showing that something is so: either a showing of a
psychological state to the audience, or the audience’s being shown that one’s
thoughts or feelings are so. In many cases empathetic understanding involves being
acquainted with the psychological state one comes to understand, either through
perception of it, or indirectly through exhibiting to oneself a psychological state with
the same qualities (or one with somewhat different qualities but which are at least
analogous to those of the original object of concern).
There is ambition and elegance in the way in which these matters are connected
together through a simple, but fruitful, picture of meaning and the initial conceit of
taking expression itself to be a form of meaning. Moreover the style with which these
diverse threads are bound together is also admirable: Green offers us a general picture
which draws not only on philosophical reflections, but the results of psychology and
other empirical sciences to give us a feel for how we should think of this aspect of the
human mind. One gets the sense not only of a powerful prolegomenon to a theory of
this particular phenomenon (or cluster of phenomena) but also a very forceful
illustration of how philosophical progress in general can and ought to be made.
The requirements on a critic, however, involve raising questions about aspects of
the project at hand, rather than taking up the invitation to explore the further
consequences of the theory, or adopt the methodology itself in application to other
puzzles about human nature. In this space I won’t concentrate on the ingenious
approach to meaning and communication, although there is much here to admire and
explore. And unfortunately I won’t have to space to raise questions about the
application to aesthetics. So I’ll just ask some questions about the underlying theory
of mind in play. And even here, of necessity, I’ll restrict my concerns.
For example, I find intriguing, but also puzzling, Green’s suggestion that we
perceive the emotions of others. He suggests that this a commonsensical thought.
But I’m not sure ordinary opinion offers a verdict on the matter. We do say things
like, ‘I saw the hate in her eyes’, ‘I could see the contempt on his lips’. But I don’t
think that commits us to supposing that we perceive the emotions, as opposed to
their expression, any more than saying that one sees his father in his face leads one
to suppose that one sees the father when one sees the son. And what puzzles me as
much, is what should turn for Green on whether we see others’ emotions. But, as I
said above, there is no room here to pursue it further.
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Instead I’ll focus on what I take to be possibly a deeper disagreement about one of
the boldest steps that Green makes: namely that we can see what unifies expression in
terms of communication and signaling. The questions I raise are just that: questions
about some of the assumptions in play in developing the picture. If that gives a
skeptical air to what follows, then I must apologize in advance for it. I do not mean to
be skeptical of the project as a whole: as I said above, Self-Expression offers us the
very model of how we should advance boldly in exploring the human mind. The intent
of this discussion is very much to underline quite what an achievement it is.
2. My starting point is a seemingly minor cavil about the title of the book, and so
its self-advertisement. The book is called ‘Self-Expression’, yet the principal topic
throughout is that of expression. Green does talk on occasion of someone’s self-
expression, and defines it explicitly on p. 43, but in most contexts that is simply
interchangeable with talk of expression without anything being lost. Certainly
nowhere in the book is expression per se contrasted with self-expression.
Yet, one might think, in common parlance self-expression is a distinctive activity
to be remarked on in contrast to the mere expression of the inner. When Madonna
exhorted late twentieth century womankind to express themselves, she assumed that
there was a distinctive activity in which they weren’t engaging quite enough.
Likewise when stale art critics complain of the Brit Art scene of the same period that
there was rather too much self-expression going on, the criticism focuses on
something narrower than just the possibility of expression that is forever present in
the arts. What people say is a not entirely reliable guide to how we should construct
theories, but both examples are at least suggestive of the thought that there is a point
to contrasting self-expression with expression per se.
Now, this may invite puzzlement: How can expression fail to be self-expression?
For, leaving aside cases of vicarious expression, one is only in a position to express
one’s own psychological states, so surely one couldn’t express anyone else’s
psychological states. If self-expression is expressing the psychological states of self,
then all expression must be self-expression. (By vicarious expression, I have in mind
those cases where an agent is authorized or delegated to pass on expression, as when
the herald expresses the king’s contempt, or the captain at the door conveys the
army’s condolences to the grieving family left behind. These are counter-examples
to the claim that all expression is self-expression, if taken by the letter, but they are
not counter-examples to the spirit of it.)
The puzzlement arises from the assumption that the point of marking some
expression as an example of self-expression is to indicate who it is whose psychological
states are in question. But that is not the most natural way of understanding the intended
contrast. Self-expression contrasts with expression more generally in that the object of
expression is the self per se rather than just some emotional state, or some opinion.
The possibility of contrasting self-expression with expression just suggests that we
don’t take all of expression to be a matter of expressing the self in this way.
Now two immediate responses on Green’s behalf would suggest that this is a
minor cavil. First, one may offer the riposte that even if we grant this observation, at
worst, this shows that Green’s theory is guilty of minor over-advertising. It may be
true that it doesn’t deal with one aspect of the theory of expression, but while that
may be of some common moral interest, that doesn’t show that it should be central
to a theory of expression in general. Secondly, and perhaps even more forcefully,
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one can point out that the extension of the theory to cover self-expression in the
sense indicated here would be a very minor addition. For self-expression may be
taken just to be a particular instance of the act of showing an object, as opposed to
showing that something is the case. Green focuses his account of showing of on
revealing one’s psychological states but in this case, what is to be shown is the self
or, perhaps, some persona offered as the social surrogate of one’s self. Along these
lines, one may concede that there is room for discussion of exactly what object is to
be shown and under what conditions it can be shown in the case of self-expression,
but still insist that is less a task for the theory of expression than a theory of the
social import of the idea of self.
In what follows I’ll pursue a slightly more pessimistic reading of the state of play,
however. What I’ll argue is that the contrast between mere expression and self-
expression throws up some more serious questions about the more general
phenomenon of expression as such. I shall question whether we should accept
Green’s central contention that what unites the various phenomena of expression is
that they are all signals of what is within. In omitting to focus on the contrast
between self-expression and expression, Green ignores the way in which it may be
important to our view of an example of expression whether the agent him or herself
is signaling the presence of a psychological state. In turn I’ll suggest that expression
includes both cases with signaling and cases without it. We can make sense of certain
examples as being cases of expression without supposing that the agent signals
anything by them, or even that they have any evolutionary function of signaling.
Green himself does admit that there are examples of involuntary expression. Still,
the picture as a whole builds on the central case of an agent signaling something
through expression. We extend from the agent’s signaling to other cases of
expression, on Green’s theory, by recognizing the role that expression can have as
a signal when it has been recruited to some evolutionary function. So purposive
signaling is central to the picture of expression on offer, and that’s why it is useful to
look at Green’s discussion of spontaneous smiles, and why in contrast to some other
theorists he classifies them as voluntary. In defending the classification of them as
involuntary, we’ll lay the basis for the proposal that we might want to think of some
expression as independent of the agent’s will, and separate from any communicative
import.
3. In chapter five Green takes issue with Paul Ekman’s contention that facial
expressions are involuntary (121ff). As Green himself acknowledges, his own theory
employs a stipulated notion of the voluntary: a piece of behavior is to be counted as
voluntary if it can be prevented at the time of onset (28). And his discussion of Ekman
focuses on whether Ekman has given a conclusive reason for supposing facial
expressions to be involuntary (presumably not in the stipulative sense that Green
wishes to employ, but whatever prior notion we might have which the stipulation
refines). I’m entirely in accord with Green that the specific features Ekman highlights
for treating such facial expressions as the Duchenne smile as involuntary are
inconclusive, but at the same time I find it quite natural to count these smiles among
involuntary affective behaviors; and although the term ‘involuntary’ has become
something of a state of art, I find Green’s stipulation here rather unnatural.
My colleague Tom Pink offered me an anecdote to illustrate the point. In his
family many years ago, there was an aged great-aunt beginning to suffer from
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dementia who was liable to utter unpleasantries. Now she was not without some
control of this disposition: if she focused on the task of preventing herself from
saying the unsayable, she could remain entirely presentable in public. However, she
didn’t always focus on that task, and words could just slip out. On at least one
occasion, presented with a bouquet of flowers at a school opening by a small boy,
she responded with a seraphic smile saying somewhat sotto voce, ‘Dirty little boy!
Dirty little boy!’ Since she had some control over herself, even if she wasn’t
exercising it on this occasion, it looks as if on Green’s account that her verbal
activity counts as voluntary. At the same time, I am inclined to agree with Pink that
we take her here to be talking involuntarily.
From the point of view of action theory that suggests Green’s definition of the
involuntary is just too narrow. Among our actions, we may be inclined to mark
something as involuntary to indicate that we have been coerced in it. Among our
behaviors, on the other hand, the point of contrasting involuntary movement from
voluntary action is to distinguish what’s an action from what’s not: that is, what
among our behaviors issues from the will. To accept Green’s stipulation while
maintaining this connotation, then, would be to say that there is no more to
something’s being a physical action of mine, nothing more to its issuing from my
will, than that I could have prevented its onset. This seems to me too impoverished a
conception of physical action, and bleaches out the point of drawing the distinction
between mere behaviors and actions in the first place. That I can, with some effort,
prevent my arm from shaking does not in itself show that when I cannot be bothered
so to control my movements, the arm’s shaking is voluntary, where that would mean
something done by me.
Now of course Green is not particularly interested in the theory of action, and so
it is open to him to claim that from the perspective of gaining a good overview of the
topic of expression, his stipulation does well enough. And, indeed, I would grant that
from the point of view of his theory, the question whether a Duchenne smile is
voluntary or not is not particularly central. Green allows that there are involuntary
expressions: a smile might, as a gasp often does, involuntarily signal the presence of
a certain emotional state; this will be so where it has been recruited as a signal, and
has a function to indicate something about the psychological circumstances of the
organism. The main information to be picked up will be what the smile or gasp itself
could convey on its own. One may add, of course, that an agent who allows such a
natural signal to manifest itself, when they could have prevented it, indicates
something through their lack of control (at least where the fact that they do not
exercise control is itself also manifest): the audience can take up that the agent has a
preparedness to be open. But the availability of this additional information would not
seem to shift the primary import of the expression, that is, of indicating the signaled
psychological state. So the significance of this primary signal would not seem to be
affected by its classification as voluntary or involuntary. If we accept Green’s wider
commitments in his theory, his stipulation about the voluntary would seem to carry
little or no cost.
All the same, if one has not already taken on board his theory of expression, one
might be inclined to treat differently those cases where something is expressive of an
inner state when an agent has no direct control over its production (whether they
could or could not have suppressed the expression) from those cases where we
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construe the agent as managing the situation and setting about to express themselves
in doing or saying something. In part what matters here is whether the theory of
expression needs to be sensitive to when an agent is acting or manifesting their will.
That question brings us back to self-expression, in the sense of expression of the
self, and with it the importance of the active/passive distinction.
4. A familiar narrative since ancient times views the agent as somewhat at the
mercy of his or her passions. Mastery of the self involves learning to control these
passions. Taken to extremes, such pictures propose a total separation between the
self and the passions which seek to dominate it. A common corrective story is liable
to insist that the active self can really be nothing over and above the desires and
other passions which may move the person to act. But this story too may go to
extremes; and in its extreme form, where we conceive of the self as nothing but the
bundle of passions, not even careful Scottish irony can make the corrective any more
plausible than the picture it seeks to replace. And so one is as likely to find accounts
of the relation between will and desire as attempting a balancing act between these
two extremes: the self standing apart from all desire and acting so as to control their
influence; the self as nothing more than the sum of one’s desires. On the one hand,
we are inclined to allow for some separation of the passions from the self,
assimilating action involving them into properly willed behavior only where the
agent identifies with, or otherwise controls, the action which flows from the passion
in question. On the other hand, we recognize that any choice or exercise of control
by an agent reflects something about his or her character, and so can indicate
something about what they really want.
The two philosophical extremes, and the attempt to find a harmonious position
between them reflects something of a puzzle we face in ordinary life of making
sense of people around us, and the strategies or hypotheses we have concerning the
role their emotions play in their actions. These different strategies reflect different
assessments of what is expressive in an agent’s behavior and what the significance of
such expressive elements can be. For example, in one situation, we may be inclined
to think that an agent is overwhelmed by their passions, giving in to anger or
jealousy, and so think of their outburst as not really expressing their true self. In this
case, we are ready to recognize a contrast between passions on the one hand and the
agent on the other. But that is not to endorse the initial extreme picture of a total
separation of these things: faced with someone who seems entirely in control, we
might complain that not enough of what is really them is on display; everything is
too controlled; too mannered. A healthy person, we may think, is someone who
allows some of their unruly passions just to show themselves. Some of the
differences among these contrasting evaluations may reflect persisting and deep
differences in the way in which agents can monitor and control their affective states
and related dispositions of behavior; but perhaps equally as notable is the way in
which we are moved by cultural fashion. In certain moods we care more for the
spontaneous and the animal in us; at other times the pure focus of control seems
better to reflect our ideas of the dear self.
What matters for our current purposes, however, is the thought that we need to
make a three-way division when looking at the behavior and general disposition of
an agent. There are the actions of the agent seen as arising from his or her will, and
these contrast with those aspects of behavior for which we take as responsible certain
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psychological forces within the agent but outside of the will. In addition to the role
of will, and of other psychological forces, we must recognize the role of an agent’s
persona, that artifact they offer to the social world, and through which they engage
and interact with other people. The last of these seems purely to belong to a world of
signs: its reality being a matter of what is to be communicated or taken up by others.
In the other two cases, we can make sense of something being there, and manifest to
us, whether or not some agent wishes to communicate its presence or not.
These three elements give us three kinds of case: one in which we see the agent as
responsible for the expressive aspect of their behavior, and thereby take them to be
communicating something to us; one in which we see other psychological forces as
revealing themselves, and take that to be expressive of some aspect of the agent,
even if not something which is properly self-expression. Finally, the possibility in
which an agent, concerned with letting too much unruly out becomes so self-
controlled, that we see the behavior as purely intended as communicative, and in
which we fail to find anything properly expressive of the agent’s true self.
So the contrast between expression in general and self-expression in particular
requires us to press the question whether the heart of expression is always a matter of
what is purposively communicated, or whether we care so much about expression
precisely because it makes manifest to us aspects of an individual’s psyche which
nothing is intending to communicate.
5. For Green the fundamental contrast between that discernible aspect of an
individual’s behavior or disposition which is expressive and that which is not is
carried by the distinction between what is signaled and what is not. According to
him, neither the bulging vein on an angry forehead nor the blushing of a bride are
expressive of what is within (or, rather, need not be), because there is no reason to
think either is a case of the organism signaling something to a potential audience.
I’m not sure whether Green thinks of this as a division we would be inclined to
accept anyway, independent of his theory, but it strikes me as a cost of his account.
For it is entirely natural to treat the bulge and the blush as aspects of the expressive
dimensions of mind. And if we shift our focus to that of an interpreter faced with the
task of making sense of an agent and their stance towards the world, then we can see
why these two should not be demoted. What the interpreter needs to know are the
things which are counted as properly psychological origins of behavior. In addition,
if the above morality tale is correct, they need to be sensitive to the question whether
those psychological origins are identified with the agent or not.
For a number of years I was concerned that my roommate in graduate school
would often show signs of anxiety: his hand shaking when he rolled a cigarette or
held a cup of coffee. But eventually I came to realize that he just had incipient
Parkinson’s disease, and had a very mild apraxia (which in no way has become more
severe in the last twenty years). The moment I realized that, I treated his movement
differently, and it looked different to me. From one perspective, low firing rates in
neural centers of motor control and an emotional state of anxiety are both just
internal causes of behavior. But faced with the normal demands of making sense of
the social world and the actors within it, we tend to treat the two very differently: the
latter kind of cause we classify as a psychological or mental cause of behavior;
something our social competence needs to keep track of; the former, we think of as
purely mechanical. So perhaps what classifies together various overt physical
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behaviors as expressive is just that we do so treat them as what we must track when
discerning the mind of an agent.
It does not seem to me that tracking mental causes in any obvious way reduces to
a concern with whether an agent has attempted to communicate or display something
or not. Obviously one way in which the emotions of an agent may get the better of
them is through insisting on calling attention to themselves to any hapless passer-by.
There is no more apt description of such manifestation than signaling, and Green is
surely right to underline it. But what is more contentious is the idea that all
expression should be some form of signaling. That I attribute his spiteful comment to
his need for revenge is sufficient grounds for me to take his action to be an
expression of his anger, I do not in addition need to suppose that he acts so as to let
the world know that he is angry; be that a conscious intention, or an evolutionary
selected function.
From this way of thinking, the bulge and the blush earn their keep as part of the
expressive realm through being a key for the interpreter as a way in to the
psychology of the subject interpreted. The route in matters much less than the object
of concern: that in making sense of others we are concerned with their psychological
aspects and the manner in which these are made manifest. Of course this is to take as
given that we classify emotional states such as anxiety along with thoughts as among
the properly mental, inner in the sense of belonging to the inner world, the mind,
rather than inner in the sense of just falling within the skin, as a propensity to low
firing rates may be.
For Green, the fundamental classification here is that of what belongs to the
subjective point of view. And the expressive is connected to this by its possession of
the functional role of signaling this subjective point of view. What I am suggesting
here is both that our fundamental category of the psychological or mental is broader
than the subjective point of view (the emotions which overwhelm me and reveal
themselves to others need not belong to my point of view on the world), and that
expression need only be thought of in terms of giving us access to the mental realm
of another (though not necessarily by perceiving it). The emphasis on signaling or
communication is also too restrictive.
In short, Green suggests that what matters for expression is what the organism can
select for signaling. In contrast, the suggestion here is that what matters is what can
be the object for others of the task of making sense of someone. From a
developmental perspective the dispute is this: Are we focused on the specialist task
of succeeding in communication, a competence of pragmatics, or the broader
competence of simply making sense of other human beings? For all the elegance of
Green’s theory, I see no reason to restrict our understanding of expression to the
former rather than the latter.
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